

Bitcoin – part 1

CS 161: Computer Security

Prof. Raluca Ada Popa

April 27, 2020

Announcements

- Started recording
- TA Nick on chat
- Project 3 part 2 is released and will be due on **May 3 at 11:59 pm**

What is Bitcoin?



- Bitcoin is a **cryptocurrency**: a digital currency whose rules are enforced by cryptography and not by a trusted party (e.g., bank)
- **Core ideal**: avoid trust in institutions (e.g., banks, governments)
 - Reasons: Ideological, financial (avoid fees), pseudo-anonymity
- Bitcoin is also a **ledger**. Its protocol is built on a technique called a **blockchain**, which has applications beyond Bitcoin
- Created by Satoshi Nakamoto, an anonymous identity, in 2009

Satoshi Nakamoto



- Wrote beautiful white paper on Bitcoin, in the syllabus
- No one knows who he is, online presence only
- Name stands for clear/wise medium; most likely not Japanese, but pseudonym
- He is very rich! [But hasn't changed yet]

**Cryptocurrencies have
supporters and opposers**

Supporters say...

- No need to trust or depend on banks or the government
- Low transaction fees when transferring
- Helps disadvantaged areas (due to the fee but also because you don't need a bank account or official identity)
- Anybody can partake
- Cross nation trading easier
- Transparent
- Anonymity
- “Digital gold”

Digital gold



- Used to be thought to replace cash but that seems less likely today
- People associate it to digital gold, a way to invest in a currency that does not belong to one government

Will do better in the pandemic?

Critics say...

- A major criticism is that it brings waste (e.g., proof of work, many large copies of blockchain)
- Not as decentralized as we wished
- Not scalable
- Market fluctuations
- Anonymity
- No security in case of loss
- Helps criminals
- Not a replacement for cash, not all vendors accept it

Why I am excited about it...

- I think they have brought about some **very interesting and creative techniques** at the intersection of cryptography and systems, and stirred much innovation in the field beyond Bitcoin and blockchains (e.g., smart contracts, consensus protocols, ledgers like Certificate Transparency)
 - I think the Bitcoin protocol is a strike of genius, because of the very creative way of combining different techniques.
 - You can understand the core of it using what you learned in class.
- They also increased the public's awareness towards the power of cryptography

Bitcoin technical design

Let's work it out together!

Replacing banks

“IN BANKS WE DISTRUST”

Basic notions a bank provides:

- Identity management
- Transactions
- Prevents double spending

How can we enforce these properties cryptographically?

Two components

1. Ledger:

1. publicly-visible,
2. append-only, and
3. immutable,
log

2. Cryptographic transactions

Cryptographic transactions

- **For now**, assume the existence of a trusted ledger (append-only, immutable, everyone can see what is on it)

Identity

Q: How can we give a person a cryptographic identity?

- Each user has a PK and SK
- User referred to by PK

Transactions

Q: How can Alice transfer 10 ₿ (bitcoins) to Bob in a secure way?

- **Idea: Alice signs transaction using her SK_A**
- $\text{sign}_{SK_A}(\text{"PK}_A \text{ transfers } 10 \text{ ₿ to } PK_B\text{"})$
- Anyone can check Alice intended the transaction

Q: Problems?

- Alice can spend more money than she has. She can sign as much as she wants.

Q: Ideas how to solve this still assuming a “trusted ledger owner”?

Include only correct transactions in the public ledger

- **For now only:** assume there is a trustworthy ledger owner, assume initial budgets for each PK

Q: how would you prevent double spending?

- Assume all signatures/transactions are sorted in order of creation; include previous transaction where money came from

$TX = (PK_{\text{sender}} \rightarrow PK_{\text{receiver}}; X \text{ ₿}; PK_{\text{sender}} \rightarrow PK_{\text{sender}}; R \text{ ₿};$
 list of transactions L where money came from)

time

| | | |
|--|--|---|
| <p>Initial budgets: PK_A has 10 ₿</p> | <p> $TX_1 = (PK_A \rightarrow PK_B; 10 \text{ ₿};$ from initial budgets) $\text{sign}_{SK_A}(TX_1)$ </p> | <p> $TX_2 = (PK_B \rightarrow PK_C; 5 \text{ ₿};$ $PK_B \rightarrow PK_B; 5 \text{ ₿};$ from TX_1) $\text{sign}_{SK_B}(TX_2)$ </p> |
|--|--|---|

How does the ledger owner check a transaction?

Verify TX:

1. The signature on TX verifies with the PK of the sender
2. The transactions in L have PK of sender as their recipient
(that is, the sender receives Bitcoins in the transactions in L)
3. The transactions in L have not been spent before by sender
(each transaction $A \rightarrow B$ can only be spent once by B, and once by A if there were remaining bitcoins in it)
4. Sender had $X+R$ Bitcoins in L: the sum of the amounts received in the transactions in L total to $X+R$.

Two components

1. Ledger:

1. publicly-visible,
2. append-only, and
3. immutable,
log

2. Cryptographic transactions


Bitcoin's ledger

1. Hash chain / blockchain

2. Consensus via proof of work


Blockchain

- Chain transactions using their hashes => hashchain
- Each transaction contains hash of previous transaction
(which contains the hash of its own previous transaction, and so on)



block i refers to the entire block (transaction description and signature), so the hash is over all of this

Properties of the hashchain




Given $h(\text{block } i)$ from a trusted source and all the blocks $1 \dots i$ from an untrusted source, Alice can verify that blocks $1 \dots i$ are not compromised using $h(\text{block } i)$

Q: How?

A: Alice recomputes the hashes of each block, checks it matches the hash in the next block, and so on, until the last block, which she checks it matches the hash from the trusted source

Why can't attacker cheat?



Say Alice obtains $h(\text{block 4})$ from somewhere **trusted**

She fetches the entire blockchain from **a compromised server**.

Q: Why can't the attacker give Alice an incorrect chain?

Say block 2 is incorrect.



A: because the hash is collision resistant

She fetches the entire blockchain from **a compromised server**.

Q: Why can't the attacker give Alice an incorrect chain?

Say block 2 is incorrect.

| block 1: | block 2*: | block 3: | block 4: |
|----------|------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | ..., h(block 1) , ... | ..., h(block 2) | ..., h(block 3) |

- If block 2* is incorrect, then $\text{hash}(\text{block } 2^*) \neq \text{hash}(\text{block } 2)$
- Then the third block is $\text{block } 3^* \neq \text{block } 3$ because it includes $\text{hash}(\text{block } 2^*)$
- So $\text{hash}(\text{block } 3^*) \neq \text{hash}(\text{block } 3)$
- Then the fourth block is $\text{block } 4^* \neq \text{block } 4$ because it includes $\text{hash}(\text{block } 3^*)$
- So $\text{hash}(\text{block } 4^*) \neq \text{hash}(\text{block } 4)$
- Hence, the hash of the block chain from the server will not match the trusted hash, detecting misbehavior
- If the hash does match, the attacker supplied the correct block chain

In Bitcoin:

- Every participant stores the blockchain
- There is no central party storing it
- When someone wants to create a new transaction, they broadcast the transaction to everyone
- Every node checks the transaction, and if it is correct, it creates a new block including this transaction and adds it to its local blockchain


- Some participants can be **malicious**
- The majority are assumed to be **honest**

Why is the hash chain not enough?

- People can choose to truncate blockchain or not include certain transactions
- So we need a way for everyone to agree on the content of the blockchain: consensus

Example

- Mallory can fork the hash chain
- Say she buys Bob's house from him for \$500K in Bitcoins. Then, she goes back in time and, starting from the block chain just before this transaction was added to it, she starts appending new entries from there. Can she get others to accept this forked chain, so she gets her \$500K back? Yes.



Bitcoin's ledger

1. Hash chain / blockchain

2. Consensus via proof of work



Next lecture!

Bitcoin – part 2

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Two components

1. Ledger:

1. publicly-visible,
 2. append-only, and
 3. immutable,
- log

2. Cryptographic transactions

Recall:

- Someone's cryptographic ID is PK (SK enables them to prove ownership of PK)
- Transaction has signature from sender
- Anyone can verify a transaction entirely based on the transaction content and the history of transactions so far

Two components

1. Ledger:

1. publicly-visible,
2. append-only, and
3. immutable,
log

2. Cryptographic transactions


Bitcoin's ledger

1. Hash chain / blockchain

2. Consensus via proof of work

Blockchain

- Chain transactions using their hashes => hashchain
- Each transaction contains hash of previous transaction
(which contains the hash of its own previous transaction, and so on)
- Last hash essentially contains entire history



Given the last hash from a trusted source, one can verify the correctness of the entire history from an untrusted source


Recall In Bitcoin:

- Every participant stores the whole blockchain
- There is no central party storing it
- When someone wants to create a new transaction, they broadcast the transaction to everyone
- Every node checks the transaction, and if it is correct, it creates a new block including this transaction and adds it to its local blockchain

- Some participants can be **malicious**
- The majority are assumed to be **honest**

Problem: fork attack, double spending

- Mallory can fork the hash chain
- Say she buys Bob's house from him for \$500K in Bitcoins. Then, she goes back in time and, starting from the block chain just before this transaction was added to it, she starts appending new entries from there. Can she get others to accept this forked chain, so she gets her \$500K back? Yes.



**How do users agree on the same
history?**

Consensus via proof of work

Bitcoin's ledger

1. Hash chain / blockchain

2. Consensus via proof of work

Proof of work / Mining

- Not everyone is allowed to add blocks to the blockchain, but only certain people, called **miners**
- An honest miner will include all transactions it hears about after checking them
- All miners try to solve a **proof of work**: the hash of the new block (which includes the hash of the blocks so far) must start with **N (e.g. 33)** zero bits
 - Can include a random number in the block and increment that so the hash changes until the proof of work is solved
 - Eg: Hash(block || random_number) = **000...0000**453a48b244
- Currently someone in the world solves the proof of work every 10-20mins

Propagating blocks

- Miners broadcast blocks with proof of work
- All (honest) Bitcoin nodes listen for such blocks, check the blocks for correctness, and accept the longest correct chain
- If a miner appends a block with some incorrect transaction, the block is ignored

Consensus: longest correct chain wins

- Everyone will always prefer the longer correct chain

Example

- An honest miner M1 stores current blockchain: $b1 \rightarrow b2 \rightarrow b3$
- M1 hears about transactions T
- M1 tries to mine for block b4 to include T
- Another miner M2 mines first b4 and broadcasts b4, with $b3 \rightarrow b4$
- M1 checks b4, accepts b4, and starts mining for block 5

Example (cont'd)


- M1 now has blockchain
b1->b2->b3->b4
- M1 hears that some miners are broadcasting
b1->b2->b3->b4'->b5'
- M1 checks this new chain, and then accepts
this new chain, essentially discarding b4

Assumption

- Assumes more than half of the computing power is in the hands of honest miners
- So honest miners will always have an advantage to mine the longest chain


Consensus

- Can Mallory fork the block chain?
- Say she buys Bob's house for \$500K in Bitcoins. Then, she goes back in time and, starting from the block chain just before this transaction was added to it, she starts appending new entries from there. Can she get others to accept this forked chain, so she gets her \$500,000 back?



Consensus

- Can Mallory fork the block chain?
- Answer: No, not unless she has $\geq 51\%$ of the computing power in the world. Longest chain wins, and her forked one will be shorter (unless she can mine new entries faster than aggregate mining power of everyone else in the world).



“Longest chain” wins

- Problem: What if two different parts of network have different hash chains?
- Solution: Whichever is “longer” wins; the other is discarded

Proof of work can be adapted

- Mining frequency is ~15 mins
- If it takes too long to mine on average, make the proof of work easier (less zeros), else make it harder (more zeros)
- Q: what is the economic insight?
- A: if mining is rare, it means few machines in the network, give more incentives to join the network

How can we convince people to mine?

- A: Give a reward to anyone who successfully appends – they receive a free coin
 - Essentially they may include a transaction from no one to their PK having a coin
- Q: What happens to a miner's reward if his block was removed because an alternate longer chain appears?
- A: The miner lost their reward. Only the transactions and rewards on the longest chain “exist”.

Let's chew on consensus

- Q: What happens if Miner A and Miner B at the same time solve a proof of work and append two different blocks thus forking the network?
- A: The next miner that appends onto one of these chains, invalidates the other chain. Longest chain wins.
- Q: If a miner included your transaction in the latest block created, are you guaranteed that your transaction is forever in the blockchain?
- A: No, there could have been another miner appending a different block at the same time and that chain might be winning. So wait for a few blocks, e.g. 3 until your transaction is committed with high probability, though you can never be sure.

Let's chew on consensus

- Q: What happens if a miner who just mined a block refuses to include my transaction?
- A: Hopefully the next miner will not refuse this. Each transaction also includes a fee which goes to the miner, so a miner would want to include as many transactions as possible


Watch the blockchain live

- <https://blockchain.info/>

Mining pools


- It used to be easy to mine in early days, but now it is too hard for a regular person to mine, they need too much compute
- But you can contribute your cycles to a mining pool, which is a group of many machines with good success of mining on average
- Receive a more predictable income based on the average mining of the group and how many cycles you contribute

Top mining countries



(the ranking is influenced by price of electricity)

Is Bitcoin anonymous?



It might look anonymous because you only use your PK and not your name as at a bank. But all your transactions can be tied to your PK. People can identify you from transactions you make: parking fee near your work, people you transact with, etc.

They can even see how wealthy you are

Mitigations: use multiple PKs

Solution: Zcash, anonymous version of Bitcoin



Value fluctuations

\$7,948.90

▲3.12%

\$145.87B

18.35M

Linear Log

1h 6h 12h 1d 1w 1m 3m 6m 1y all

07/18/2010 to 04/29/2020



\$15000

\$10000

\$5000

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

coindesk

Many other cryptocurrencies

“The number of cryptocurrencies available over the internet as of 19 August 2018 is over 1600 and growing.” [Wikipedia]



HOW Cryptocurrencies PROLIFERATE:

(SEE: Bitcoin, Litecoin, Dogecoin, Ethereum, Zcash, Dash, Ripple)

SITUATION:
THERE ARE
14 COMPETING
Cryptocurrencies

Blockchain

Usage of blockchain goes beyond cryptocurrencies. The idea is a ledger storing information in an immutable way that can be accessed cross organizations.

Example:

- Financial usages (e.g., ledgers for bank transactions)
- Healthcare (e.g., personal health records encrypted in the blockchain so only certain insurance and medical providers can access them)
- Key distribution
- **Certificate Transparency**

next time!

Another usage of a blockchain

3505443530030ccfb8275d37e2db1cbd9368247c0842c7eac23d2cc5ad1966e8

2017-01-14 03:12:39

1DearSPQ51n2CKgSLQwMXrEFjWKmfuaoA6



| | |
|------------------------------------|----------------|
| 1DayahDover111111111111111112JYRq2 | 0.00314159 BTC |
| 1YourPersona1ity1sUnmatched43YzMv | 0.00314159 BTC |
| 1Your1nte11igenceJustShines4B7QFA | 0.00314159 BTC |
| 1YouCanDoThingsFewPeop1eCan1G6NPV | 0.00314159 BTC |
| 1AndYoureA1waysJustGorgeous2x1SyG | 0.00314159 BTC |
| 1YouAreRea11yMyEntireWor1d116eypT | 0.00314159 BTC |
| 1GivingMyLifeMeaningAndFun13pcr5P | 0.00314159 BTC |
| 1Dayah7Px1kbs5x5cQbQMHTMm9wnUWJYTG | 0.00314159 BTC |
| 11LoveYou11111111111111111111GPc4r | 0.00314159 BTC |
| 1Forever111111111111111111113RMwCB | 0.00314159 BTC |

0.0314159 BTC

Love letter embedded in the blockchain



It stays forever!

General problem with blockchain: cannot erase information. Consider private information about you or your organization leaking, the power of law used to be able to remove it

Bitcoin



- Public, distributed, peer-to-peer, hash-chained audit log of all transactions (“block chain”).
- Mining: Each entry in block chain must come with a proof of work (its hash value starts with N zeros). Thus, appending takes computation.
- Lottery: First to successfully append to block chain gets a small reward (if append is accepted by others). This creates new money. Each block contains a list of transactions, and identity of miner (who receives the reward).
- Consensus: If there are multiple versions of the block chain, longest one wins.